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investing cash flows, and other benchmarks. Corporate derivatives use appears to be a small piece of non-
financial firms’ overall risk profile. This suggests a need to rethink past empirical research documenting the
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How Much do Firms Hedge with Derivatives? 
Abstract 
Previous research offers little large-sample evidence on the magnitude of non-fmancial 
fums' risk exposure hedged by financial derivatives. In a sample of 234 large non-fmancial 
corporations that use derivatives, we fmd that if the median fum simultaneously experiences a 
three standard deviation change in interest rates, currency exchange rates, and commodity prices, 
it will collect $15 million of cash from its entire derivatives portfolio and that the entire 
derivatives portfolio will rise in value by $31 million. These dollar amounts are modest relative 
to fum size, operating cash flows, investing cash flows and other fum benchmarks. The fmdings 
raise questions about the role of derivatives securities held by non-fmancial ftrms. 
1 . Introduction 
Corporate risk management 1s thought to be an important element of a firm's overall 
business strategy. Stulz (1996, pp. 23-24) draws upon extant theories of corporate risk 
management to argue ''the primary goal of risk management is to eliminate the probability of 
costly lower-tail outcomes - those that would cause fmancial distress or make a company unable 
to carry out its investment strategy. ,,J. Financial derivatives - currency, interest rate, and 
commodity derivatives - are one means of managing risks facing corporations. If a fmn's 
derivative positions generate positive cash flows or value in periods of economic adversity, then 
those derivatives are deemed to hedge the frrm's risk 
Previous research presents mixed evidence that corporate uses of fmancial derivatives are 
consistent with the extant theories of corporate hedging. With the exception of industry studies 
like Tufano (19%) and a detailed case study like Brown (2001), previous research analyzes 
categorical data on whether corporations use fmancial derivatives, or data on the notional 
principal of corporate derivative positions to test whether corporate uses of derivatives accord 
with the corporate risk management theories. 2 However, none of the previous studies documents 
large-sample evidence on the magnitude of risk hedged by the firms' fmancial derivatives. The 
primary objective of our study is to provide insight into the importance of corporations' fmancial 
derivatives portfolios in managing risk 
For a random sample of 234 large non-fmancial corporations, we present detailed 
evidence on the cash flow and market value sensitivities of fmancial derivative portfolios to 
extreme changes in the underlying assets ' prices. That is, for simultaneous extreme changes m 
1 See Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985), DeMarzo and Duffie ( 1991), Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), Smith 
(1 995), Ross (1997), and Leland (1998), among others. 
2 See Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993), Dolde ((1995), Berkman and Bradbury (1996), Mian (1996), Tufano 
(1 996), Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997 and 1999), Petersen and Thiagarajan (1997), Allaynnis and Ofek (1998), 
Haushalter (2000), Brown (2001), Gay and Nam (1999), Guay (1999), Howton and Perfect (1999), Rajgopal and 
Shevlin (1 999), Loderer and Pichler (2000), Hentschel and Kothari (200 1), and Graham and Rogers (2000). 
2 
interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity pnces, we estimate (i) the dollar cash flow that a 
fum would derive from its derivatives portfolio, referred to as the cash flow sensitivity; and (ii) 
the change in the market value of the fum's derivatives portfolio, referred to as the market value 
sensitivity. For each sample fum, we estimate the derivatives portfolio's cash flow and market 
value sensitivities using corporate disclosures about the types of interest rate, currency, and 
commodity derivative securities held by a fum, the notional principals of each type of security, 
and the derivatives' remaining time to maturity. Information about corporate derivative positions 
is gathered from fums' Form 10-K filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
for the fiscal year 1997. 
In estimating the magnitude of risk hedged by a fum 's derivatives portfolio, we make 
three assumptions intended to ensure that we do not underestimate the importance of derivatives 
securities in fums' hedging programs. First, we assume each fum's entire derivatives portfolio 
hedges its downside risk exposure (i.e., the cash flow generated by each derivative security is 
perfectly negatively correlated with the fum's unhedged cash flow). Second, we estimate the 
sensitivity of each fum's derivatives positions to extreme changes in the underlying asset prices 
(i.e., interest rates, currency exchange rates, or commodity prices), where we defme an extreme 
change as three times the annual standard deviation of the historical time series of movements in 
the asset prices. Finally, we assume that the prices of all three underlying assets simultaneously 
experience a three standard deviation change, and that the effects of these price movements on 
the cash flows and value of firms' derivatives positions are perfectly positively correlated. 
Summary of results. The median derivatives user's derivatives portfolio consists of 
interest rate derivatives with a notional principal of $200 million, currency derivatives with a 
notional principal of $123 million, and commodity derivatives with a notional principal of $51 
million. The median (75th percentile) fum's derivative cash flow sensitivity is $15 ($85) million, 
and the market value sensitivity is $31 ($129) million. That is, when the median derivatives user 
fum simultaneously experiences a three standard deviation change in interest rates, currency 
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exchange rates, and commodity pnces, the entire derivatives portfolio nses m value by $31 
million, with $15 million of this amount coming as cash flow in the current period. As indicated 
above, our calculations are generous in that we assume the underlying assets' price changes are 
all in the direction that would generate cash inflow from each finn's interest rate, currency, and 
commodity derivatives positions. 
For most of the sample fums, the cash flow and market value sensitivities are small 
relative to the magnitudes of operating and investing cash flows, absolute values of the changes 
in operating cash flows, and measures of economic exposures. For example, the median 
derivatives user's annual operating cash flow and investing cash outflow are $178 and $178 
million, respectively. As another example, our regression estimates of the sensitivity of the 
median fum's equity value to a three standard deviation change in interest rates and currency 
exchange rates is $825 million and $458 million, respectively. We reach similar conclusions 
when the cash flow and matket value sensitivities are compared to the fums' other economic 
characteristics, such as fum size, cash holdings, PPE expenditures, and absolute changes in 
operating cash flow or accounting income. 
In addition to reporting average magnitudes of cash flow and market value sensitivities 
for the derivatives users, we examine whether the fmns that theory predicts to benefit most from 
hedging hold derivatives positions with relatively larger cash flow and matket value sensitivities. 
For example, corporate hedging theories suggest that high volatility of fum value and cash flows, 
the presence of investment opportunities, and high leverage should incline fums to engage m 
hedging activities. We also consider agency theory predictions that managers might hedge to 
reduce contracting costs. For example, fums may allow CEOs with eammgs- and stock-based 
compensation contracts to remove uncontrollable market risks, or may allow managers in a 
multi-divisional fum to hedge away market exposures in their respective performance. We fmd 
some evidence of increased use of derivatives for larger fums and fums with greater investment 
opportunities, as well as for more geographically diverse fums and when CEOs have a greater 
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sensitivity of wealth to stock pnce. However, the magnitudes of the derivatives positions are 
quite small for all partitions of the data. For example, the quintile of firms with hrgest market-to-
book ratios would receive 17% of its annual investing cash flow from its derivatives portfolio in 
the event of a simultaneous three standard deviation change in interest rates, currency exchange 
rates, and commodity prices. Further, several of the fum characteristics are correlated, and 
multivariate tests indicate that only geographic diversification consistently explains fmns' 
hedging intensity. 
In summary, the results suggest most fmns hold derivatives positions that are small in 
magnitude relative to their typical investment cash flows or market value sensitivities. 
Maintaining an economically small derivatives program is potentially consistent with fmns: i) 
using derivatives to ' 'fme tune" their overall risk-management program that likely includes other 
means of hedging (e.g., operational hedges through diversified manufacturing sites),3 ii) making 
decentralized decisions on derivatives use (e.g., divisional decision making) for internal 
budgeting or performance evaluation purposes,4 or iii) using derivatives for purposes other than 
risk-management (e.g., to speculate on asset prices). 
Outline of the paper. Section 2 reviews the theories of corporate risk management. 
Section 3 describes sample selection and presents descriptive statistics on the econom1c 
characteristics of sample firms and their derivative positions. The main results of the paper 
appear in Section 4. We report the sample flfffiS' cash flow and market value sensitivities in the 
event of extreme changes in the underlying assets ' prices. Section 4 also reports descriptive 
3 If this conclusion is valid, it emphasizes the importance of considering corporate derivatives use within the context 
of a much larger hedging program in empirical studies of corporate risk management. One potential driver of this 
finding is that much of the overall risk facing firms (e.g., operating risk) cannot be managed through the use of 
standard derivatives contracts written over assets prices such as interest rates, exchange rates and commodity prices. 
Further, some firms may restrict their use of derivatives to transaction-based hedging, such as managing the risk 
inherent in foreign sales/purchases or specific interest-bearing debt securities. 
4 Brown (200 1) reaches some similar conclusions using extensive transaction-level derivatives data for one large 
multinational corporation. Specifically, he finds that the impact of the derivatives instruments has a limited effect 
on the firm's cash flows, and that internal budgeting and performance evaluation play a substantial part with respect 
to the objectives of the derivatives program. 
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statistics for the sensitivities as a fraction of the sample fums' economic exposures in the event 
of extreme movements in the underlying assets' prices and their historical average cash flow 
variability. We summarize the paper and offer conclusions in section 5. 
2. Hypothesis development and risk management theory 
In the absence of market imperfections, hedging does not affect fum value (Modigliani 
and J\1iller, 1958). The theory of corporate risk management identifies several market 
imperfections that can make volatility costly. These imperfections can be broadly summarized 
as: (i) fmancial distress costs (J\1yers, 1977; Smith and Stutz, 1985); (ii) costly external fmancing 
(Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993); (iii) taxes (Smith and Stutz, 1985); and (iv) costs of 
managerial risk aversion (Stulz, 1984; Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
While all of the risk management theories posit that hedging can increase finn value, the 
type of fum risk targeted by the theories varies. The fmancial distress cost arguments generally 
point toward volatility of fum value as the risk measure to be hedged. Smith and Stulz ( 1985) 
argue that hedging can increase the value of a levered fum when the expected costs of fmancial 
distress are decreasing in fum-value. By narrowing the distribution of fum-value outcomes, 
hedging reduces the expected costs of fmancial distress. Myers (1977) demonstrates that 
fmancial distress can provide equityholders with incentives to forgo positive net-present-value 
projects if the gains accrue primarily to ftxed claimholders. Hedging fum value reduces the 
probability of distress and the likelihood that equityholders will fmd it beneficial to pass up 
valuable projects. 
The hedging theories that emphasize costly external fmancing focus on the volatility of 
cash flows as the risk measure to be hedged. For example, Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) 
hypothesize that if external fmancing is more costly than internal fmancing, hedging can be a 
value-increasing activity if it more closely matches fimd inflows with outflows, thereby lowering 
the probability that a fum needs to access the capital markets. With respect to tax motivations 
for hedging, Smith and Stulz (1985) demonstrate that a reduction in the volatility of taxable 
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mcome can lower expected taxes for fmns with convex effective tax functions.5 Finally, when 
managers are risk averse and under-diversified with respect to their compensation and fum-
specific wealth, they are likely to require extra compensation to bear this risk Thus, managers 
have an incentive to reduce fmn risk and hedging can potentially reduce the required risk 
premmm (Stulz, 1984 and Smith and Stulz, 1985). However, the type of risk targeted for 
hedging, be it cash flow, earnings, or stock price volatility, is likely to depend on the nature of 
the managers' compensation contract and fum-specific wealth. 
The risk management theories are relevant to this study because our goal is to examme 
the extent to which fums hedge their risk exposures with derivative securities. The risk 
management theories described above point to at least three risk exposures of interest: (i) 
volatility of fum value; (ii) volatility of cash flows; and (iii) volatility of income. Because it is 
not possible to identify a single risk measure that fully captures a fmn's motivation for using 
derivatives, we examine the magnitude of frrms' derivatives positions relative to each of these 
risk measures for all sample fmns. 
To gain additional perspective on fmns' risk management practices, we also examine the 
magnitude of risk hedged by the derivatives positions relative to other fmn characteristics: 
(i) Firm size measured as market value of equity, book value of assets, cash flow 
from operations, net income, and absolute values of the changes in operating cash 
flows and net income; 
(ii) Investing activities measured as PPE expenditures and cash flow from investing 
activities; 
(iii) Liquidity measured as cash and marketable securities; 
(iv) Interest expense for fmns that use interest-rate derivatives; and 
5 Although we do examine income volatility as a potential determinant of derivatives use, we do not conduct a 
detailed analysis of tax convexity as a determinant of derivatives use. Graham and Smith (1999) find that tax 
convexity is not large for most firms and Graham and Rogers (2000) find that tax convexity is not an important 
determinant of derivatives use. 
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(v) Exposures of stock returns to fmancial prices, such as interest rates for fums that 
use interest-rate derivatives and exchange rates for fums that use exchange-rate 
derivatives. 
The preceding discussion focuses on fums ' risk management incentives under the 
assumption that managers' incentives are aligned with the shareholders. However, agency 
considerations might motivate managers to use derivatives to further their self-interest. 
Managers of large fums with diversified business segment operations and geographically diverse 
operations might engage in hedging to smooth out their divisional performance. In addition, risk 
averse managers might seek to smooth out their divisional or frrm-level earnings performance 
through derivatives because they are compensated based in part on their accounting performance. 
We use several proxies to capture managers' agency incentives for using derivatives and test 
whether these are correlated with the fmns' intensity of derivatives use. 
3. Sam pie selection and descriptive statistics 
Section 3.1 describes our sample selection procedure and the derivatives variables for 
which we gather information from firms' fmancial filings. In section 3.2 we present descriptive 
statistics on a number of economic characteristics of the sample frrms that are useful in assessing 
the degree to which firms' derivatives positions might hedge potential risks facing the frrms. 
Section 3.3 explains the procedure we employ to calculate cash flow and market value 
sensitivities using information about frrms' derivatives positions and extreme movements in the 
underlying asset prices. 
3.1 Sample selection 
We use the Compustat Annual database to identifY an initial sample of the 1,000 largest 
market valued stocks as of the end of 1995. We also require that these stocks have return data on 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes and that they have a December fiscal 
year-end for fmancial reporting purposes. We focus on large stocks because previous evidence 
shows that large fums are more likely derivatives users (see, for example, Nance, Smith, and 
8 
Smithson, 1993, Graham and Rogers, 2000, and Hentschel and Kothari, 2000). Another reason 
is that the largest 1,000 firms represent a large fraction of the value-weighted portfolio of the 
U.S. stocks and thus are economically important. Availability of return data on CRSP enables us 
to estimate fums ' economic exposures and market value sensitivities. Finally, restricting the 
sample to December year-end fmns facilitates data analysis by allowing consistent assumptions 
about prevailing interest rates, exchange rates and commodity prices when we estimate cash flow 
and market value sensitivities. 
From the initial sample of 1,000 largest fmns, we select every other fum and reduce the 
sample to 500 fums. The reason for this reduction is to facilitate our hand collection of a 
significant quantity of information about each fnm 's derivative positions as of December 1997 
from Form 10-K filings with the SEC for ftscal year 1997.6 Of the 500 sample fums, 73 fums 
merged or went out of business between the sample selection year, 1995, and the year the 
derivatives data are collected, 1997. This attrition is more common among the smaller firms in 
the sample. We exclude fums if the Form 10-K filings indicate that derivatives are used for 
trading purposes as opposed to hedging purposes. We drop 15 fmns that state trading as the 
purpose for at least a portion of their use of derivatives. 
For each fum, we collect FYE 1997 information on the types of derivative securities 
held, the notional principal of each derivative instrument held, the remaining time-to-maturity of 
each instrument held, and whether the firm uses derivatives for trading purposes. Fiscal year 
1997 is the latest year for which data were available at the time we began gathering data for this 
study. For 1997, GAAP pertaining to disclosure about fmancial derivatives is contained in 
Financial Accounting Standard No. 119, ' 'Disclosure about derivative fmancial instruments and 
6 Even though we gather derivatives data for 1997, we select the sample from 1,000 largest firms as of 1995, not 
1997. The reason is that market value is positively correlated with immediate past performance (i.e., largest firms 
are likely to have experienced good past {Erformance and smallest firms bad performance). If firms' use of 
derivatives at the end of a period is correlated with past performance, use of 1997 market value rankings might have 
confounded with the analysis . To avoid this danger, we sample firms from amongst the 1,000 largest firms as of the 
end of 1995. 
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fair value of fmancial instruments," which was released in 1994. Appendix A contains a sample 
of derivatives disclosure according to SFAS 119 for Intel Corporation in its 1997 Form 10-K 
filing with the SEC. 
3.2 Descriptive characteristics 
In Table 1, we present means and medians of fum size and a number of operating flow 
variables, including three-year average cash flow from operations and average absolute change 
in cash flow from operations, average net income, and average property, plant, and equipment 
expenditures, etc. We select these variables because corporate hedging theories argue that risk 
management programs are designed to either make-up potential shortfalls in cash flows from 
operations to be used for investment purposes or to hedge against a drop in finn value. Later 
analysis calibrates changes in the market value of fums ' derivatives positions against finn size, 
and cash flow from fums' derivative positions against operating flow variables and against 
absolute values of the changes in the flow variables. Such comparisons are one means of 
examining the extent to which fums' derivatives positions hedge market values, operating flows, 
and shocks to operating flows in the event of extreme changes in the underlying assets' prices. 
For each descriptive variable, Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 report mean and median values 
for the aggregate sample; the next two columns provide descriptive statistics separately for 
derivatives users and the last two columns contain data for derivatives non-users. Firms 
reporting derivative positions at flScal year-end 1997 are users and non-users report no derivative 
positions. There are 234 (56.7%) derivatives users out of the aggregate sample of 413 fums and 
the remaining 179 (43.3%) fnms are non-users of derivatives. We mainly discuss the descriptive 
statistics for the derivatives users because the analysis examining the extent to which derivatives 
are used for risk management pertains to derivatives users. While the average market value of 
$5.9 billion for the aggregate sample is large because of our sample selection criterion, the 
derivatives users are the relatively larger fnms with an average market value of $8.6 billion, 
compared to $2.4 billion for the non-users. Market value as well as all other variables in Table 1 
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exhibit right skewness in that the medians are considerably lower than the means, but even the 
median firm is quite large. 
[Table 1] 
The flow variables in Table 1 are three-year annual averages usmg data from 1995 to 
1997. The descriptive statistics suggest derivatives users generally have large positive operating 
cash flows, net incomes, and investment cash flows. Average annual cash flow from operations 
for the users is $735 million and these fmns on average invest $454 million in property, plant, 
and equipment annually. The fmns are highly profitable in that derivatives users' mean 
(median) average annual net income is $318 million ($74 million). As an indicabm of the cash 
flow shocks the derivative users experience, we report the three-year average absolute change in 
annual cash flow from operations and net income, as well as the maximum absolute change in 
annual cash flow from operations and net income during the years 1995-1997. The average 
(maximum) absolute change in cash flow from operations is $194 million ($349 million) for the 
derivatives users and the corresponding numbers for net income changes are $139 million ($230 
million). 
3.3 Derivatives data and descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the notional principal of the derivatives positions 
as reported in the fmns ' Form 10-K filings at the 1997 fiscal year end. The information applies 
only to the 234 derivatives user sample fmns. We partition the derivatives into foreign 
exchange, interest-rate, and commodity instruments. In each category, we further partition the 
instruments by type, e.g., swaps, forwards, and options. For each fum, we sum the notional 
principal for each type of security held in each category. The first column in Table 2 reports the 
number of fmns that hold each type of security, and the next seven columns provide descriptive 
statistics for the outstanding notional principal calculated using data for the fmns that hold those 
securities. The last two columns provide the mean and standard deviation of time-to-maturity for 
each category of securities held by the fmns. Note that these descriptive statistics describe the 
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reported derivatives positions held by the fnms at fiscal year end and may differ somewhat from 
the average derivatives positions held by the firms during the year. 
Consistent with the fmdings in previous research, Table 2 reveals that foreign exchange 
(FX) and interest rate (IR) derivatives constitute the bulk of the activity both in terms of the 
number of users and the amount of derivatives used. Within the FX derivatives category, 124 of 
the 143 users have positions in forwards and futures, whereas only 33 fmns have FX swaps and 
27 have FX options. Median notional principal of the FX forwards and futures users is $68 
million and ranges from $0.6 million to $9.5 billion. The median notional principals are 
substantially greater for FX swap and option users at $243 million and $203 million, 
respectively. Of the 143 fnms that hold IR derivatives, swaps are the most popular securities 
(137 users), whereas IR caps and forwards are used by only a handful of fmns (24 users). The 
median fnm 's IR swap position, however, is only $180 million of notional principal. Thllty-six 
firms use commodity derivatives with a median notional principal of $40 million across all three 
instnunents- forwards and futures, swaps, and options.7 
[Table 2] 
The average time-to-maturity of the FX and IR swaps is about 5 years compared to about 
1-2 years for commodity derivatives and FX and IR forwards and options. This is not surprising 
because swap contracts are typically designed to hedge periodic cash flows over long horizons 
(e.g., bond interest payments), whereas long-horizon forwards and options contracts are 
extremely illiquid or non-existent 
4. Results: Derivative positions' market value and cash flow 
sensitivities 
In this section, we present evidence on the cash flow and market value sensitivities a the 
derivatives positions to extreme changes in the underlying asset prices. We begin by describing 
7 For reporting purposes, certain types of commodity positions are not considered derivative instruments. For 
example, long-term purchase or sales contracts that fix commodity prices are not considered derivatives for 
reporting purposes if they are expected to settle in units of the commodity as opposed to cash. 
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how we calculate the sensitivities for each derivative security. We then examme the extent to 
which the derivative positions can potentially hedge fnms ' market values or operating flows m 
the event of extreme asset price movements. At the end of this section we explore whether the 
sensitivities of the derivatives positions are relatively larger for subsamples of fums with greater 
expected incentives to hedge. We also examine whether additional variables chosen to proxy for 
managers' agency-theory-based incentives to hedge (e.g., eammgs smoothing and hedging in a 
multi-divisional fum) explain cross-sectional variation in the intensity of fmns' hedging 
activities. 
4.1 Estimation procedure for derivative sensitivities 
We estimate the cash flow and market value sensitivities of each fum's aggregate 
derivatives portfolio position at 1997 ftscal year end. Cash flow sensitivity is defined as the 
change in the annual cash flow resulting from each derivative security in the portfolio for a three 
standard deviation annual change in the price of underlying asset (i.e., change in interest rates, 
exchange rates, or commodity prices). Similarly, we defme market value sensitivity as the 
change in the value of each derivative security for a three standard deviation annual change in 
the prices of underlying assets. We assume that the cash flow and change in value are perfectly 
positively correlated within each class of derivative security (i.e., none of the positions are 
offsetting). Graham and Rogers (2000) report that, on average, after netting out offsetting long 
and short derivatives positions, fums' net notional principal is only 50% of gross notional 
principal. 1bis fmding suggests our measures of fums' gross derivative sensitivities are likely to 
substantially overstate fums' net derivative sensitivities. We estimate cash flow (market value) 
sensitivities for each fum as the sum of cash flow (market value) sensitivities across all the 
derivative securities in the portfolio.8 
8 We recognize that shocks to asset prices are not necessarily normally distributed, and as such, the probability of a 
three standard deviation change can be greater than that suggested by the normal distribution. Our choice of three 
standard deviations is simply intended to represent a low probability event. 
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The market value sensitivity measure 1s relevant to assessmg the derivatives portfolio's 
importance for risk management if firms use derivatives to hedge flrm value. For example, fums 
may wish to mitigate stock price exposure to changes in interest rates, exchange rates, or 
commodity prices to reduce the probability and costs of fmancial distress and underinvestment 
problems. The cash flow sensitivity measure is useful in gauging the importance of derivatives 
for risk management if firms use derivatives to hedge cash flows or income. For example, firms 
may use derivatives to dampen cash flow volatility to reduce the likelihood that they incur the 
costs of accessing external capital matkets to undertake valuable investment opportunities. 
We illustrate our estimation of the cash flow and market value sensitivities below usmg 
foreign exchange forwards and then discuss the estimation of interest rate and commodity 
derivative sensitivities. Similar details for other FX derivatives instruments, e.g., swaps and 
options, and for interest rate and commodity derivatives appear in Appendix B, with only a 
summary of the salient issues pertaining to the estimation procedure in the text below. 
Caslt flow and market value sensitivity of FX forwards. The cash flow sensitivity 
(matket value sensitivity) of FX derivatives to exchange rate movements is measured as the 
estimated change in FX derivatives' annual cash flows (value) for a simultaneous, perfectly 
positively correlated 33% change in the currency exchange rates underlying the FX derivatives. 
We use 33% because it equals three times the average historical standard deviation of annualized 
percentage changes in the US dollar exchange rates for the ten most heavily weighted currencies 
in the Federal ResetVe's Nominal Major Currencies Dollar Index. The annualized standard 
deviations are computed using quarterly observations over the 10-yr period from 1988 through 
1997.9 
9 To annualize the exchange rate, interest rate and commodity price standard deviations, we multiply the quarterly 
standards deviations by the square root of 4. This procedure assumes independence across the quarterly changes. 
Empirically the autocorrelations across quarterly changes are small, ranging from -0.12 for our commodity price 
index to +0.1 4 for interest rate series. 
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The cash flow sensitivity of an FX forward contract to a three standard deviation change 
in the currency exchange rate is estimated as 
($ notional principal) x 33%. 
Because FX forwards ahnost invariably have maturities of a year or less, we assume the market 
value and cash flow sensitivities to be the same. For longer duration derivatives, such as swaps, 
the market value and cash flow sensitivities will be different, often substantially so. Even if the 
forward contract matures in less than one year, we assume a 33% rate change, which is greater 
than a three standard deviation change for a horizon of only a fraction of one year. 
Interest rate and commodity derivatives. We measure market value (cash flow) 
sensitivity of IR derivatives to interest rate movements as the estimated change in IR derivatives' 
value (annual cash flow) for a 3.4 percentage point change in the 6-month yield on J:.bills. The 
choice of 3.4 percentage points reflects a 3 standard deviation change in the annualized 
percentage point change in the 6-month T-hill yield using quarterly observations over the 10-yr 
period from January 1988 through December 1997. 
We estimate commodity derivatives' sensitivity to a 3 7% change in the underlying 
commodity pnce. For our sample fmns, a majority of the commodity derivatives are written 
over some form of fuel-related resource, e.g., petroleum and natural gas. The choice of 37% 
reflects a three-standard-deviation change in the annualized percentage return on the quarterly 
Producer Price Index for Fuel over the 10-yr period from January 1988 through December 1997. 
An alternative choice for the commodity index would be a more general index, such as the 
Producer Price Index for All Commodities. However, because this index reflects a portfolio of 
commodity prices, its volatility is far lower than the volatility of a single commodity index. For 
example, the annualized standard deviation of the All Commodities Index is 2% versus 12.5% 
for the Fuel Index, though the correlation between these two indexes is high at 0.81. Therefore, 
we choose the more volatile Fuel Index to avoid underestimating the sensitivity of the 
commodity derivatives positions. 
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4.2 Descriptive statistics on sensitivities 
Table 3 reports descriptive data on cash flow and market value sensitivities for the 
derivatives users ' aggregate derivatives portfolios and also by type of derivative security. The 
mean and median market value sensitivities for the fmns ' aggregate derivatives portfolios are 
$158 million and $31 million, respectively. The corresponding mean and median aggregate cash 
flow sensitivities are $112 million and $15 million. The disparity between the mean and median 
underscores the influence of a relatively few intensive derivatives users (e.g., the largest market 
value and cash flow sensitivities are $3.4 billion and $3.2 billion, respectively). On average, FX 
derivatives make a larger contribution to cash flow sensitivity than IR derivatives. However, 
because the average time to maturity for IR derivatives is considerably longer than that of FX 
derivatives, the contribution of IR and FX derivatives to market value sensitivity is roughly 
equal. For most fmns, commodity derivatives contribute substantially less sensitivity than either 
FX or IR derivatives. 
[Table 3] 
In interpreting the sensitivities reported in Table 3, note that our assumptions m 
estimating aggregate sensitivity measures are extremely generous in the following respects: i) 
For each fmn, all derivative securities of the same type are assumed to have payoffs that are 
perfectly positively correlated. For example, if a fum holds ten different FX contracts on ten 
different currencies, the value of all the contracts are assumed to move together. Similarly, if a 
fmn holds a combination of IR swaps, caps, and forwards, the values of all the securities are 
assumed to move together with interest rates. ii) All option-like securities are assumed to be deep 
in the money, thereby we assume the maximum sensitivity. iii) The aggregate sensitivity is an 
estimate of the change in the value of a fmn's derivative securities assuming a three standard 
shock simultaneously occurs for interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity pnces. Further, 
we assume that the cash flow and value implications of all three shocks are perfectly positively 
correlated across all types of derivatives held. 
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To determine the likely implications of this third assumption for our results, we examme 
the correlation structure across interest-rate, exchange-rate and commodity (PPI) price indices 
for the period January 1988 to December 1997. The indices exhibit moderate cross-correlations, 
ranging from 0.23 to -0.40. To explore the extent to which our assumption of perfect positive 
correlation across the indices overstates the sensitivities in Table 3, we estimate the expected 
change in any two of the indices when the third index experiences a three standard deviation 
change. To do this, we ftrst standardize the three time-series to have the same standard deviation 
in price changes and then estimate pair-wise regressions between each of the indices. The 
regresston coefficients reflect the expected change in an index (measured in standard deviations) 
for a one standard deviation change in another index. Extrapolating these coefficients to a three 
standard deviation change yields the following table: 
Three standard 
deviation change in: 
Interest rates 
Exchange rates 
Commodity prices 
Expected change in 
interest rates (in 
standard deviations) 
3.0 
0.8 
0.4 
Expected change in Expected change in 
exchange rates (in commodity prices (in 
standard deviations) standard deviations) 
0.8 0.4 
3.0 1.0 
1.0 3.0 
The above table suggests that the probability of a simultaneous three standard deviation change 
in all three indices is much less likely than a three standard deviation change in any one index. 
Further, conditional on a three standard deviation change in one index, the expected change in 
the other two indices is considerably smaller than three standard deviations. This analysis 
suggests that our estimates substantially overestimate the aggregate cash flow and market value 
sensitivities of the derivatives positions in the event of a large shock to any one of the underlying 
asset prices. 
17 
4.3 Scaled sensitivities 
If derivative securities are an important component of risk management programs 
designed to increase fmn value, the potential change in the value of a fnm's derivatives positions 
should be economically significant when compared to potential hedging objectives, such as fmn 
value, operating flows, and/or the fmn's underlying risk exposures. Since the appropriate 
comparison depends upon the objective of the risk management program and theories of risk 
management, we report results comparing fnms ' derivative positions' sensitivities to a variety of 
fmn characteristics. 
Table 4 scales fmns ' aggregate derivatives portfolios' cash flow and market value 
sensitivities by the sample characteristics in Table 1.10 In interpreting the scaled sensitivities, we 
assume that the derivative securities' value is perfectly negatively correlated with the scaling 
variable, i.e., the derivatives are perfect hedges. To the extent that the derivatives are not a 
perfect hedge (and it is inconceivable that they are a perfect hedge for all of the scaling 
variables), the reported scaled sensitivities overstate the potential impact of the derivatives 
positions on the firms' risk management program. Also, note that, unlike the numerators in the 
scaled sensitivities, the data from the denominators are simply taken from the three most recent 
years, 1995-1997, and are not selected to reflect extreme realizations. Further, some of the 
scaling variables, such as cash flows, income and assets, are influenced by the cash flow 
realizations from fmns' derivative positions. The extent to which our scaling variables reflect 
"normal" years and are affected by realizations from derivatives positions depends in part on 
whether movements m interest rates, exchange rates and commodity prices were "unusual" 
during the 1995-1997 period. An analysis comparing prce movements during the 1995-1997 
10 The scaling variables measure firm characteristics that could potentially be targeted for hedging and are not direct 
measures of firms' risk exposures. It is possible that many of the firms' assets and cash flows are not highly sensitive 
to changes in interest rates, exchange rates and commodity prices. For these firms, the derivatives sensitivities are 
expected to be small relative to the firm characteristics, even if the firms are using derivatives to fully hedge their 
core exposures. However, in these cases, one would still conclude that derivatives use is not an economically 
important component of a risk management program designed to increase firm value. 
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period with price movements during the longer 1988-1997 period indicates that the 1995-1997 
period was not unusual. Interest rate, exchange rate and commodity price volatilities were 
slightly lower during 1995-1997 compared to 1988-1997, and the 1997 levels of these asset 
prices were not substantially different from the 1995 levels. 
Even with these and earlier discussed generous assumptions, the results in Table 4 
suggest that for most fnms, the sensitivities are not a hrge fraction of the scaling variables. For 
example, the matket value sensitivity as a fraction of the market value of equity averages 0.04, 
the median is 0.01, and the 75th percentile is 0.04. Thus for three quarters of the sample fnms, in 
the event of extreme simultaneous movements in interest rates, currency exchange rates, and 
commodity prices, the generously estimated change in the value of the fnms ' aggregate 
derivatives portfolio is no greater than 4% of their current equity market values. 
[Table 4] 
Average values of the cash flow sensitivities as a fraction of the fnms' operating flow 
variables are quite large (e.g., 0.58 when the scale is three-year average CFO), but are driven by 
extreme observations (e.g., the maximum is 30.23), generally resulting from small denominators, 
i.e., low average flow values. The median scaled values are between 0.10 and 0.30 for most of 
the variables. For example, the estimated values suggest that the cash flow from the derivatives 
portfolio would be 90/o of the three-year average investing cash flow in the event of extreme 
movements in the underlying asset prices. Considered in isolation, this increment to a fum's 
cash flows under extreme circumstances seems low, especially in light of the generous 
assumptions we make in estimating the sensitivities. The extent to which shocks to operating 
cash flows are hedged can be inferred from the cash flow sensitivity scaled by the three-year 
average of the absolute changes in operating cash flow or the three-year maximum absolute cash 
flow change. The median ratios of these two variables are 0.18 and 0.33. Overall, the evidence 
suggests either derivatives constitute a small fraction of a fum 's overall risk-management 
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program and/or finns leave a large portion of their financial risks unhedged, and/or derivatives 
securities are frequently used for purposes other than hedging entity-level risk 
The preceding analysis examines derivatives portfolios' sensitivities as a fraction of fmn 
characteristics that proxy for the potential hedging needs of a fum. For another perspective on 
this issue, we next directly estimate fmns' market value exposures to interest rates and currency 
exchange rates, and examine the extent to which fmns ' derivatives portfolios potentially hedge 
these exposures. We report estimated market-based exposures in Table 5 and scaled sensitivities 
in Table 6. The analysis below ignores exposure to commodity prices because a relatively small 
fraction of the sample fmns uses commodity derivatives and fnms do not consistently report all 
of the commodity prices to which they face risk exposure. 
Table 5 reports sample fmns ' market-based exposures to interest rates and exchange 
rates, and volatility of market value of equity. To estimate interest-rate and exchange-rate 
exposures, we regress monthly stock returns on the monthly change in the 6-month T-hill yield, 
the monthly percentage change in the Federal Reserve's Nominal Major Currencies Dollar 
Index, and the monthly return on the CRSP value-weighted market index (for similar procedures, 
see Wong, 2000; Guay, 1999; and Hentschel and Kothari, 2001). We estimate the regressions 
separately for each sample fum using data for the 3 years ending December 1997. We defme 
estimated interest rate exposure as the product of the absolute value of the regression coefficient 
on the interest rate variable multiplied by a 3.4 percentage point change in the 6-month T-hill 
yield, which serves as an extreme change in the interest rate. Since the regression coefficient is 
estimated using fmns' stock returns as the dependent variable, the exposure calculated as above 
is denominated in percentage of the market value of equity, i.e., stock return. Similarly, the FX 
exposure is the absolute value of the regression coefficient on the FX variable times 33% change 
in the Federal Reserve's Nominal Major Currencies Dollar Index. In addition to return 
exposures, we also report dollar exposures. Dollar exposures are equal to the return exposures 
multiplied by the market value of equity at December 1997. 
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Results in Table 5 reveal that the sample fmns' median market-based exposure to a three 
standard deviation change in interest rates is quite substantial at 25%, or in dollar terms, $0.83 
billion. The fmns' FX exposures are smaller than the interest rate exposures, but nevertheless 
quite substantial. The median FX exposure is 17% of the market value of equity or $0.46 billion. 
Note that because the estimates of interest-rate and FX exposures are net of any hedging 
activities, our measures underestimate the fmns' core exposures to interest rates and exchange 
rates. We recognize that our tests may be hampered by estimation error in our measures of 
interest rate and exchange rate exposures. To examine the severity of this concern, we perform 
two sensitivity tests: (i) using only fums with statistically significant interest rate and exchange 
rate exposures, and (ii) using only fums with exposure coefficients that are in the top quartile 
with respect to the precision of the estimates (i.e., regression coefficients with standard errors in 
the lowest quartile). The inference from these sensitivity tests is the same as the inference from 
the reported results. 
[Table 5] 
We defme fums' exposure to stock-return volatility as the annualized standard deviation 
of fums' monthly stock returns over the ~year period ending December 1997. The dollar stock-
return volatility is the annualized standard deviation of monthly returns multiplied by the market 
value of equity at December 1997. Table 5 shows that the sample fums ' exposures measured in 
terms of stock-return volatility are comparable to interest-rate exposures. Firms' annualized 
stock-return volatility is on average 300/o and the median is 26%. 
Table 6 scales the market value sensitivities of the fmns' derivative securities by the 
estimated dollar exposures to interest rates and exchange rates, and the dollar volatility of market 
value of equity. The median scaled sensitivities to IR and FX exposures are 0.03 and 0.06, 
respectively. The scaled sensitivities reflect the fraction of the change in stockholder value that 
would be offset by derivatives in the event of a shock to asset prices. For the scaled interest rate 
measure, the numerator includes only the market value sensitivity from interest rate derivatives. 
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Similarly, for the scaled exchange rate measure, the numerator includes only the market value 
sensitivity from FX derivatives. The market value sensitivity for all derivative securities are 
included in the numerator of the scaled market value of equity volatility measure. 
As mentioned above, since estimated exposures are net exposures as opposed to core 
exposures, they impart an upward bias into the scaled sensitivities. The reason is that, assuming 
market efficiency, net exposures are smaller than core exposures because they already reflect the 
hedging consequences of the fmns ' derivatives portfolio. In spite of this bias in favor of the 
magnitudes of scaled sensitivities, the scaled sensitivities are small for most of the sample fmns. 
These fmdings suggest that derivative securities are unlikely to have a significant impact on 
entity level interest-rate exposures, the exchange-rate exposures, or the stock return volatility. 
Note that our inference is with respect to entity-level exposures as opposed to 
transaction-level exposures. Entity-level risk exposures subsume transaction-level exposures but 
also include operational risk exposures such as supply, demand and competitive effects related 
to changes in interest rates or exchange rates. We make no statements about the portion of a 
particular type of transaction-based exposure that is hedged, such as the fraction of foreign sales 
hedged with exchange rate derivatives or the portion of variable-rate debt that is hedged with 
interest rate derivatives. It is possible that contracting costs or the desire to qualify for hedge 
accounting treatment drive some fnms to engage in transaction-level hedging. Our data simply 
suggest that if fmns do hedge a large portion of these transaction-level exposures, then the 
transaction-level exposures make up a relatively small fraction of finns' overall market value 
exposures to interest rates, exchange rates and commodity prices. 11 
[Table 6] 
11 For example, Allayarmis and Weston (2001) use the notional amount of foreign currency derivativ es scaled by 
foreign sales as a proxy for the amount of exchange-rate exposure hedged by their sample firms. They find that this 
ratio averages 22%. Our results suggest that this hedge ratio overstates the amount exchange rate risk that firm 
hedge with exchange rate derivatives, in large part because foreign sales fail to capture important elements of entity-
level exchange-rate exposure . 
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4.4 Risk-management theories and cross-sectional variation in scaled sensitivities 
In this section we examine cross-sectional variation in the intensity of derivatives use. 
Evidence in the preceding sections indicate that most fmns' derivatives positions are nnlikely to 
significantly reduce the volatility of fmn value or cash flows. However, it is possible that the 
intensity of derivatives use is economically large for firms with the greatest incentives to hedge 
according to risk-management theories. We therefore analyze the relation between variables that 
proxy for the determinants of hedging and fmns ' scaled cash flow and market value sensitivities. 
We also entertain the possibility that derivatives are used by fmns for other purposes, such as to 
smooth income and/or to reduce contracting costs between the fmn and risk-averse employees. 
An important feature of our inference that differs from previous research is that we emphasize 
the magnitude, not simply the statistical significance of the relation between derivatives use and 
determinants of hedging. 
Proxy variables for determinants of hedging. Based on the risk-management theories 
discussed in section 2, we expect cash flow volatility, growth opportunities, and leverage to 
proxy for firms' incentives to hedge. We measure cash flow volatility as the average absolute 
change in the ratio of annual cash flow from operations to assets from 1994-1997. We also use 
an earnings-based volatility measure, calculated similar to the cash-flow-based measure, on the 
premise that earnings represent a forecast of a fmn's future cash flow generating ability (see, 
e.g., Dechow, Kothari, and Watts, 1998). The market-to-book ratio of assets captures a fum ' s 
growth opportunities. Leverage is calculated as the ratio of debt to the market value of assets 
and serves as a proxy for the probability of frnancial distress. 
We also examine fum size, segment diversification and geographic diversification. Finn 
size, measured as book value of assets, proxies for the potentially greater benefits of hedging for 
smaller fmns because the direct costs of distress do not increase proportionately with fmn size 
(Warner, 1977). In addition, previous research shows that small fmns' earnings and cash flows 
are more volatile than those of large fmns. Segment and geographic diversification are crude 
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proxtes for the degree of diversification of the sources of cash flows to the fum, suggesting a 
negative correlation between these variables and the demand for hedging. We estimate segment 
diversification with an entropy measure of total product diversification calculated from data on 
the Compustat Industry Segments File and is defmed as L,Piln(l/Pi) where Pi is dollar sales of 
principal product i scaled by total fum sales. Geographic diversification is also an entropy 
measure calculated from data on the Compustat Geographic Segments File and equal to 
L,Giln(l/Gi) where Gi is dollar sales represented by geographic segment i scaled by total fum 
sales. We also include the cash and marketable securities variable described in Table 2. 
Substantial holdings of cash and marketable securities can act as alternative means of risk 
management by providing the fum with a buffer against cash shortfalls. 
Firm size, segment diversification, and geographic diversification might also spur the 
demand for derivatives by managers because of contracting reasons. Large, diversified fnms are 
more likely to be multi-divisional. At the divisional leve~ variation in profits or revenues due to 
variation in fmancial prices may be uninformative about managers' performance. If the costs of 
writing contracts to remove this variation are large, fums might rationally allow lower-level 
managers to smooth performance with derivatives, even though these positions are not large 
enough to significantly hedge entity-level risk. These fums' managers might engage in hedging 
to smooth out their divisional performance. Thus, whereas diversified sources of cash flows for 
these fums would suggest less intensive demand for derivatives, agency considerations would 
predict these fums to use derivatives more intensively. 
A related contracting argument also applies to top executives, such as the CEO. Optimal 
contracts written between fums and their executives often impose risk on the executive through 
stock-based and accounting-based performance measures. The cost of these contracts to the fum 
increases with the noise in the performance measures. To reduce contracting costs, fums may 
allow executives to remove uncontrollable market risks through hedging with derivatives. We 
use two proxies to capture executives' incentives to mitigate uncontrollable market risks through 
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hedging with derivatives. The frrst variable is a measure of stock-based incentives computed as 
the sensitivity of the value of a CEO's stock and option portfolio to a one percent change in stock 
price. We estimate the sensitivity of the CEO's option portfolio to stock price using the method 
described in Core and Guay (2000) and data from the Execucomp database. The second variable 
is a measure of the CEO's incentives from annual bonuses. This variable is defined as total cash 
bonus paid to the CEO over the previous three years as a fraction of the total pay to the CEO 
over the same period.12 Total pay includes cash pay plus grants of restricted stock, options and 
other annual compensation, and is calculated using data from the Execucomp database and from 
proxy statements for fmns not listed on Execucomp. 
Evidence on cross-sectional variation in hedging intensity. 
To explore how the intensity of derivatives use varies with hypothesized determinants, 
we partition the fmns that use derivatives into quintiles based on the proxy variables described 
above. Table 7 reports median scaled sensitivities for the frrst, third, and ftfth quintiles of the 
proxy variables. Although we report results for only three of the scaled sensitivities (i.e., market 
value sensitivity scaled by assets, cash flow sensitivity scaled by three year average investing 
cash flows, and cash flow sensitivity scaled by the largest absolute change in net income during 
the previous three years), the results are similar for the remaining scaled sensitivity measures. 
[Table 7] 
Table 7 indicates that the scaled sensitivities are not large for most of the quintile 
rankings. In no quintile does the median firm's market value sensitivity exceed 3.2% of assets. In 
the columns where hedging intensity is defmed as scaled cash flow sensitivity, the median values 
are generally small, in most cases less than 0.30. Some of the hedging proxy variables are 
correlated with derivatives intensity in the direction predicted by theory. For example, hedging 
intensity increases with the ratio of market value to book value of assets across the quintiles. 
12 We recognize that this variable measures managers' incentives to smooth earnings with error because it does not 
incorporate the influence ofnon-linearities in the shape of the bonus scheme. 
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However, while a positive correlation between hedging intensity and proxtes for the incentives 
to hedge is consistent with risk management theory, such a fmding is not sufficient to conclude 
that derivative securities are an economically important component of ftrms' hedging programs. 
The largest median scaled cash flow sensitivity in Table 7 is 0.47 for the quintile of ftrms 
with the greatest geographic diversification (when the scaling variable is the largest absolute 
change in net income during the previous three years). In fact, geographic diversification exhibits 
the strongest and most consistent relation with derivatives intensity across the columns in Table 
7. A potential confounding issue is that ftrm size also exhibits a consistent positive relation with 
derivatives intensity and larger ftrms are expected to be more diversified. In Table 8, we rank 
ftrms ftrst into quintiles by size, and then within each size quintile by above and below median 
geographic diversification to explore whether ftrm size influences the observed relation between 
diversiftcation and derivatives intensity. The results clearly suggest that geographic 
diversiftcation, and not size, is strongly positively related to derivatives intensity. In each size 
quintile, ftrms with above median geographic diversification exhibit significantly higher 
derivatives intensity, and in several cases, the magnitude of the median ftrm's derivatives 
intensity is quite large. 
[Table 8] 
Multivariate regressiOns of derivatives intensity on the proxtes for hedging incentives in 
Table 9 support the obsetVed importance of geographic diversification in explaining derivatives 
intensity. These regressions use cash flow and market value sensitivities scaled by assets as the 
dependent variables. In each speciftcation, geographic diversification is the only variable with a 
coefficient that is significantly different from zero. The coefficients on cash and marketable 
securities and the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price are in the predicted direction and 
marginally signiftcant. Alternative regression specifications that use other scaled sensitivities 
from Table 4 as the dependent variable yield similar results. The results are also similar for a 
tobit specification that includes the non derivatives users as a way to control for self-selection 
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tssues. When the interest rate and exchange rate exposures reported m Table 5 are included as 
independent variables, their coefficients are generally negative and marginally significant, 
suggesting that fmns with greater exposure to interest rates and exchange rates have lower 
derivatives intensity. However, none of the other results are altered when these variables are 
included. 
[Table 9] 
5. Summary and conclusions 
In this paper, we examme the hypothesis that fmancial derivatives are an economically 
important component of corporate risk management While previous research explores whether 
the corporate use of derivatives is consistent with theories of hedging, none of the previous 
studies documents large-sample evidence on the magnitude of a firm's risk exposure hedged by 
the financial derivatives. Absent such evidence, it is difficult to assess the importance of 
corporations' fmancial derivatives portfolios in managing risk 
For a random sample of 234 large non-fmancial corporations, we present detailed 
evidence on the cash flow and market value sensitivities of financial derivative portfolios to 
extreme changes in the underlying assets ' prices. That is, for simultaneous extreme changes m 
interest rates, exchange rates, or commodity prices, we estimate (i) the dollar amount of cash 
flow that a firm would derive from its derivatives portfolio; and (ii) the change in the market 
value of the firm 's derivatives portfolio. The median (75th percentile) firm's cash flow sensitivity 
to extreme changes in the underlying assets ' prices is $15 ($85) million, and the market value 
sensitivity is $31 ($129) million. For most of the sample ftrms, these cash flow and market value 
sensitivities are small relative to the magnitude of traditional measures of economic exposures, 
or operating and investing cash flow measures. For example, the median ftrm holds derivative 
securities that, even under very generous assumptions, could hedge only 3% to 6% of its 
aggregate interest-rate and currency exchange rate exposures. Our inferences in this respect are 
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broadly consistent across a variety of economic measures that capture different aspects of fnms 
risk exposures. 
Our results suggest that the magnitude of the derivatives positions taken by most fnms is 
economically small in relation to their typical risk exposures. Maintaining an economically small 
derivatives program is potentially consistent with fums: i) using derivatives to ''fine tune" their 
overall risk-management program that likely includes other means of hedging (e.g., operational 
hedges through diversified manufacturing sites), ii) making decentralized decisions on 
derivatives use (e.g., divisional decision making) for internal budgeting or performance 
evaluation putposes, or iii) usmg derivatives for putposes other than risk-management (e.g., to 
speculate on asset prices). 
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Appendix A 
Intel Corporation, Footnotes to Financial Statements for 1997 
Derivative financial instruments 
Outs t a ndi n g noti ona l amoun t s f o r der i vat i v e fin ancial ins t rumen t s a t fis cal y e a r-ends 
wer e a s follows : 
I n mil l i ons ) 1 9 97 1 9 96 
Swa ps h edgi n g inv estments i n debt secu r it i e s $ 2 ,017 $ 900 
Swa ps h edgi n g inv estments in e qui ty s e curit ies $ 6 04 $ 91 8 
Swa ps h edgi n g debt $ 155 $ 456 
Cu r rency forward c ont racts $ 1 ,72 4 $ 1 , 49 9 
Cu r ren c y opt i ons $ 5 5 $ 94 
Option s hed g i ng investment s 
l n ma r keta b l e equity s ecu r i t i es $ $ 8 2 
Wh i le t h e cont r act or notion a l amounts p r ovi d e one me a s ur e of the v o lume of the s e 
t r a ns a c tio n s , t hey d o n ot rep r ese nt t he amou nt of the Compa ny ' s e xposure to credit 
r isk . The amou n t s pot e n t i al l y s u b j ect t o credit risk ar i s i ng f rom t he pos s i ble 
i n abi l i t y of count e rpa r t ies to me et t h e terms o f t heir contracts ) are g e neral ly l i mi t ed 
t o the a mounts , i f any , by whi ch t h e c ounterpar tie s ' o b l i gat i ons excee d the obli gations 
of the Compan y . The Company controls c r edi t risk t h rough credit appr ovals, l i mits and 
monitor i ng p r o ced u r e s . Cr e dit rati ng c r i t er i a f o r off- b a lance - s h e e t transact i ons a r e 
s i milar to t h o se f o r investment s . 
Swap agr e emen t s. The Compa ny u t ilize s s wap agr e ement s t o e x c hange the fore i g n 
c u r rency, equ i t y and i n t eres t rate r eturns of i t s investment and debt po rtfol ios f o r 
f l oatin g U. S . dol l ar i n teres t rat e bas ed r e t u rns . The f loa t i ng r a t es on swaps are bas e d 
primari l y on U. S . doll a r LIBOR and are reset o n a mont h l y , q ua r te r ly or semiannu a l 
b a sis . 
Pa y r ate s o n swap s hed g i ng i nvestment s i n debt secur i t i es match t h e yie l d s on t h e 
underlyi ng inv e stmen ts t hey hedge . Pa yment s on swaps h e d ging inves tments i n e qui t y 
s e curi t i es ma tch t h e e qui ty returns on the under l y i ng i nves tment s t hey h edge. Re ce i v e 
r a t es o n s wa p s hedg i n g debt ma tch t h e expense o n t h e unde r l ying d e bt t h e y hedge . 
Ma t uri ty d ates o f s waps ma tch t h ose of t h e under l y i ng inv estment o r the d e bt they 
h e d ge . Th ere i s app r oxima t ely a on e -to - one matching o f s waps t o i nvestmen t s and deb t . 
Swap a greements r emain in effect unt i l expiration . 
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Wei ght e d aver a g e p a y a nd r e ce i v e rat e s , a v e r age matur i t i e s a nd r a n ge of matur i t i e s on 
s wa ps a t Dec embe r 27 , 1 99 7 we re a s f o l lows : 
Swa p s h edgi n g inv e stme n t s 
i n u . s . doll ar d ebt 
s e cur i t ies 
Swa ps h edgi n g inv e stmen t s 
i n for e ign c urr e ncy 
d e bt s e cur i t i es 
Swa ps h edgi n g inv e stme n ts 
i n e q u i ty s e c u r i t ies 
Swa p s h edgi n g d e b t 
We i gh t ed 
ave r a ge 
pay r a t e 
6 . 1% 
6 . 3 % 
N/ A 
5 . 9% 
We i ght e d 
aver a g e 
r e cei v e 
r a t e 
5 . 8 % 
5 . 9 % 
5 . 7 % 
5 . 2 % 
We ighted 
av e rage 
ma t u ri t y 
. 9 y e a r s 
1. 0 ye a r s 
. 6 ye a r s 
1.6 y ear s 
Ran g e o f 
ma turit ies 
0 - 3 y e ar s 
0 - 3 y e ar s 
0 - 2 y e ar s 
0 - 11 y e ar s 
Not e : Pay a n d r e c eive r at e s a re b a sed on t h e re s et r a t es t h at were i n ef f ect a t 
De c emb e r 27, 1 99 7 . 
Othe r f o r eign c u r r enc y i nstruments. I n t el tran s act s b u s i ne s s i n v a r ious foreig n 
c u r ren c i es , p rimar ily J apane se y e n and cert a i n other As i a n and Europea n curre ncies . Th e 
Compan y h as e s t abl i s hed r evenu e and b a l ance she e t h edg i n g p r og rams t o prot ect a g ain s t 
r e d uct i ons i n v alue a nd v o l at i l i ty o f f u t ure c a sh f l ows c au s ed b y c han ge s in fore i g n 
e x c h ang e r a t e s . Th e Compa ny u t il i z e s c u r r enc y f orwa r d c ont r a c ts an d c u r r ency opt ions i n 
t h e se h e d gin g p rog r ams . Th e mat u r i tie s on t h e s e i n s t r ume n ts a r e l es s t h a n 12 month s . 
De f erred g a i n s or los s e s a t t ribut able to f o r eign currency i n struments are not ma teria l . 
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Fair values of financial instruments 
Th e est i ma ted f a i r values of finan cial instruments outs t a ndin g a t fi s c a l year-ends 
wer e a s fo l lows : 
I n mi l l i ons ) 
Ca s h a n d c a s h e q u i val e nts $ 
Sh ort- t erm i nvestments $ 
Tr a d ing as s e t s $ 
Lon g-te r m i nv e s t ments $ 
Non - ma r keta b l e i n s trume nts $ 
Swa ps h edgi n g inv estments 
i n d e b t s e c u r it i e s $ 
Swa ps h edgi n g inv estments 
i n e q u i ty s e cur i t ies $ 
Op t ions hedgi ng i nve s t ment s in 
ma rket able e qui t y securit i e s $ 
Short- t e rm d e bt $ 
Long-te r m d e bt r e d eema ble 
within one year $ 
Lon g-te r m d ebt $ 
Swa ps h edgi n g debt $ 
Currency forward c ont r a cts $ 
Cu r ren c y o p t i ons $ 
Carry ing 
amou n t 
4 , 1 02 
5,5 61 
1 95 
1, 8 2 1 
3 87 
64 
8 
212 ) 
110 ) 
4 48 ) 
26 
1 
1 997 
Est i mated 
fa i r 
val ue 
$ 4 , 10 2 
$ 5 , 56 1 
$ 19 5 
$ 1 , 82 1 
$ 4 9 7 
$ 6 4 
$ 8 
$ 
$ 21 2 ) 
$ 109 ) 
$ 44 8 ) 
$ 1 ) 
$ 2 8 
$ 1 
Car r y i ng 
amount 
$ 4 f 165 
$ 3, 736 
$ 87 
$ 1 f 4 18 
$ 1 19 
$ 1 2 ) 
$ 2 7 ) 
$ 25 ) 
$ 3 8 9 ) 
$ 
$ 7 2 8 ) 
$ 
$ 5 
$ 
19 9 6 
Es t imated 
fair 
v a lue 
$ 4,165 
$ 3,73 6 
$ 87 
$ 1, 4 1 8 
$ 194 
$ 12 ) 
$ 27 ) 
$ 25 ) 
$ 389 ) 
$ 
$ 731 ) 
$ 13 
$ 18 
$ 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Appendix B 
For simultaneous extreme changes in interest rates, exchange rates, or commodity prices, 
we estimate for each sample fnm: (i) the dollar amount of cash flow that a fnm would derive 
from its derivatives portfolio, referred to as the cash flow sensitivity; and (ii) the change in the 
market value of the fum's derivatives portfolio, referred to as the market value sensitivity. We 
describe this estimation procedure below for each class of derivative security. 
Foreign currency derivatives 
For foreign currency derivatives, an extreme change is defmed as a 33% change in the 
currency exchange rate. A 33% change equals three times the average historical standard 
deviation of annualized percentage changes in the US dollar exchange rate for the ten most 
heavily-weighted currencies in the Federal Reserve's Nominal Major Currencies Dollar Index. 
The annualized standard deviations are computed using quarterly observations over the 10-yr 
period from 1988 through 1997. 
FX forwards 
The cash flow and market value sensitivities of an FX forward contract to a 33% change 
in the currency exchange rate are estimated as: 
($ notional principal) x 33%. 
Because FX forwards almost invariably have maturities of a year or less, we assume the market 
value and cash flow sensitivities to be the same. For forward contracts that mature in less than 
one year, the assumed 33% change likely overstates a three standard deviation shock to exchange 
rates. 
FX options 
Market value sensitivity and cash flow sensitivity of an FX option to a 33% change m 
currency is estimated as: 
($ notional principal) x 33% 
Again, because FX options tend to have maturities of a year or less, we assume the 
market value and cash flow sensitivities to be the same. 
Our sensitivity measure overestimates the actual sensitivity of most of the options 
because the computation assumes that all options are "deep in the money'' (i.e., an option delta of 
one). For example, if the option is substantially out-of-the-money, the dollar sensitivity of option 
value to exchange rate movements is very small. The sensitivity of an option approaches the 
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sensitivity of a fotward contract (i.e., sensitivity of one) in the limit as it moves deep in the 
money. Because the strike price is rarely disclosed in the Form lOK footnotes, it is not possible 
to precisely estimate the option sensitivity with public data. While the time-to-maturity of the 
options is sometimes disclosed, this information alone is not sufficient to accurately estimate 
option sensitivity. Therefore, we assume all options have the maximum possible sensitivity. 
FX swaps 
Market value sensitivity of an FX swap to a 33% change in the currency exchange rate is 
estimated as: 
($ notional principal) x 33% 
The rationale is as follows. From Hull (1997), 
Value of swap= (S x BF)- BD 
where 
S = spot exchange rate expressed as number of units of domestic currency per unit of foreign 
currency, 
BF =the value, measured in the foreign currency, of the foreign-denominated bond underlying 
the swap, and 
BD =the value of the U.S. dollar bond underlying the swap. 
Therefore, assuming 
Bp = BD = notional principal of the swap in $US, 
then 
Market value sensitivity of FX swap = ($ notional principal) x 33% 
This should roughly be true when the firm first enters into the swap smce the interest 
rates on swaps are likely to be set so that each bond trades at par. However, as exchange rates 
and interest rates change over time, the above assumption will no longer be valid for all fnms. 
Though, on average, it might still hold approximately. 
Cash flow sensitivity of an FX swap to a 33% change in the currency exchange rate is 
estimated as : 
Cash Flow Sensitivity ofFX swap = ($ notional principal) x 8% x 33% 
In a plain vanilla currency swap, the parties to the swap exchange interest payments m 
two foreign currencies each period and swap back the principal payments in the two foreign 
currencies at the maturity of the swap. Therefore, the sensitivity of the annual cash flows from a 
35 
foreign currency swap to a giVen change in exchange rates depends on the size of the interest 
payment and the magnitude of the change in exchange rates. Because the interest rate Wlderlying 
currency swaps is rarely disclosed in the lOK report, we assume that foreign currencies are 
swapped by all fmns at an interest rate of 8%. This interest rate is larger than the interest rates 
on Treasury bills and five-year US bonds in effect at 12131197 (or at any time in the three-year 
period leading up to this date), and therefore is not likely to Wlderestimate the cash flow 
sensitivity ofFX swaps held by the sample fnms. 
We include foreign exchange interest rate swaps in this group. These are currency swaps 
that also swap fixed for floating interest rates and vice versa, in addition to the swap of 
currenctes. For these swaps, the estimated FX sensitivity is like a comparative static. It 
measures the sensitivity to exchange rates holding interest rates constant The sensitivity of this 
swap to exchange rates is computed just like the standard FX swaps above. However, since the 
value and cash flows of this type of swap are also sensitive to changes in interest rates, we 
include them in theIR sensitivity computations below as well. 
Interest rate derivatives 
We measure market value (cash flow) sensitivity of IR derivatives to interest rate 
movements as the estimated change in IR derivatives' value (annual cash flow) for a 3.4 
percentage point change in the 6-month yield on T-bills. The choice of 3.4 percentage points 
reflects a 3 standard deviation change in the annualized percentage point change in the 6-month 
T-hill yield using quarterly observations over the 10-yr period from 1988 through 1997. 
IR swaps 
Cash flow sensitivity of an IR swap to 3.4% change in interest rates is estimated as: 
Cash flow sensitivity of an IR swap=($ notional principal) x 3.4%. 
In a plain vanilla interest rate swap, each party either pays or receives a cash flow equal 
to a floating interest rate times the notional principal of the swap. Therefore, when interest rates 
change, the change in periodic cash flows equals the notional principal multiplied by the change 
in interest rates. 
Market value sensitivity of an IR swap to 3.4% change m interest rates 1s estimated as 
follows. From Hull (1997), 
Value of swap = Bnoating - Bfixed 
where 
Bfloating =the value of the floating-rate bond underlying the swap, and 
Bfixed =the value of the ftxed-rate bond underlying the swap. 
Assume 
Bfloating = &xed = notional principal of the swap 
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Bfloating always equals notional principal immediately after a payment date. Since the 
swap normally has a value of zero at initiation, Brixed should be equal to notional principal at 
initiation. Of course, this equality will generally not be true during the life of the swap. Though, 
on average, it might still hold approximately. Given this assumption, 
Market value sensitivity of an IR swap = Change in &xed for a 3.4% change in interest 
rates 
To compute this sensitivity, we must assume the fiXed coupon rate that underlies the 
swap and the prevailing interest rates that should be used to discount the bond's cash flows. A 
random sampling of about 150 companies reveals that 40% of the sample fums provide 
information about the interest rates underlying their swaps. In these cases, the coupon rates 
almost always fall between 5.5% and 6.5%. 
We assume that the coupon rate and discount rate are both equal to 6% for all swaps, all 
fums, and all maturities. We then perturb the discount rate by ±3.4%, to 2.6% and 9.4%, and 
compute the aggregate value of each fum's swaps at each of these discount rates. The average 
absolute value of the outstanding swaps computed at these two discount rates is taken as the 
interest rate sensitivity of the derivatives. 
While most ftrms disclose the time to maturity of their swaps, some disclose a range of 
maturities, and others make no disclosure at all. For the fums that report a range of maturities, 
we take the midpoint of the range as the time-to-maturity. For companies that do not disclose 
anything, we assume a time-to-maturity of 5 years, which is the average swap maturity for the 
fmns that do provide disclosure. 
We also include the IRJFX swaps when computing interest rate sensitivities. As indicated 
above, these are IR swaps that also swap currencies. Here, as with the FXIIR swap, the 
sensitivity is like a comparative static. It measures the sensitivity to interest rates holding 
exchange rates constant The sensitivity of this swap to exchange rates is computed just like the 
standard IR swaps above. Since this type of swap is also sensitive to changes in exchange rates, 
we include them in the FX sensitivity computations above. 
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IR forwards 
We assume each forward contract is written on a 5-yr Treasury note with notional 
principal equal to the disclosed notional principal. We assume the fmn holds the 5 yr note and 
estimate the cash flow sensitivity of the forward a;; the cash flow from the forward as a result of 
a 3.4% change in interest rates. Similar to our computations for interest-rate swaps, we assume 
that the initial discount rate on the note is 6% for all IR forwards. The initial value of the note is 
assumed to be equal to [$notional principal I 1.06)5]. We then perturb the interest rate by ±3.4%, 
to 2.6% and 9.4%, and compute the change in value of the notes at each of these discount rates. 
The average absolute change in value for the notes computed at these two discount rates is taken 
as the interest rate sensitivity of the IR forward derivatives. Because IR forwards held by our 
sample firms almost invariably mature within a year, we assume the market value and cash flow 
sensitivities to be the same. 
We include the three sample fmns with IR options m this group as well. As with the 
forwards, we assume the options are written on a 5-yr Treasury note. As with the FX options, 
this sensitivity measure should overestimate the ' 'true" sensitivity because our computation is 
appropriate only for options that are "deep in the money". 
IR Caps, IR Floors, IR Collars 
Caps, floors, and collars are similar to swaps except that the swap payments occur only 
when interest rates are above (caps and collars) or below (floors and collars) some pre-specified 
interest rate. To compute an upper bound on the cash flow sensitivity, we assume that all caps, 
floors and collars are deep in the money. Under this assumption, if the interest rate changes by 
3.4%, the annual cash flow from the cap changes by [3.4% * $ notional principal]. As such, we 
estimate the cash flow sensitivity of the cap, floor, or collar as 3.4% * notional principal. The 
estimation of market value sensitivity is more complicated because caps, floors, and collars are 
generally bundles of options that have staggered times to maturity. For example, a 5-year cap 
might be made up of 20 caplet options that expire each quarter. To compute an upper bound on 
the market value sensitivity, we again assume that all the caplets are deep in the money and that 
the annual cash flow from the cap changes by [3.4% * $ notional principal] when interest rates 
change by 3.4%. Thus, the market value sensitivity of the cap is the present value of an annuity, 
where the cash flow is equal to [3.4% * $ notional principal], and the length of the annuity is the 
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time-to-maturity of the cap, floor, or collar. While a collar is the combination of a put option and 
a call option and specifies an upper and lower interest rate, only one of the options, either the put 
or the call, can be deep in-the-money at a given time. Therefore, the method used for caps and 
floors is a reasonable upper bound on the sensitivity of collars. 
Commodity derivatives 
The cash flow sensitivity of commodity derivatives to commodity pnce movements 1s 
measured as the estimated change in commodity derivatives' annual cash flow for a 37% change 
in the underlying commodity price. A majority of the commodity derivatives used by our sample 
fmns are written over some form of fuel-related resource, e.g., crude oil and natural gas. The 
choice of 37% reflects a three-standard-deviation change in the annualized percentage return on 
the quarterly Producer Price Index for Fuel over the 10-yr period from January 1988 through 
December 1997. An alternative choice for the commodity index would be a more general index, 
such as the Producer Price Index for All Commodities. However, because this index reflects a 
portfolio of commodity prices, its volatility is far lower than the volatility of a single commodity 
index. For example, annualized standard deviation of the All Commodities Index from 1/88 
through 12/97 is 2% versus 12.4% for the Fuel Index, though the correlation between these two 
indexes is high at 0.81. We choose the more volatile Fuel Index to avoid underestimating the 
sensitivity of the commodity derivatives positions. 
Using the same logic described above for FX derivatives, the cash flow sensitivity of the 
commodity forwards and options for a 37% change in the price of the underlying commodity is 
estimated as: 
Cash flow sensitivity of commodity forward = $ notional principal x 37%. 
Because the commodity forwards and options held by our sample fmns tend to mature in 
less than one year, we assume that the market value sensitivity of these securities is the same as 
their cash flow sensitivity. 
For commodity swaps, the disclosed notional principal is the total quantity of the 
commodity swapped over the duration of the swaps held. The cash flow sensitivity varies 
somewhat over time depending upon the total quantity of the commodity swapped during each 
fiscal period. For simplicity, we assume that notional quantity swapped each year is equal to the 
total notional quantity swapped divided by the number of years until all the swaps mature. 
Therefore, the cash flow sensitivity of commodity swaps is estimated as: 
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Cash flow sensitivity of commodity swap [$ notional principal x 37%] I maturity m 
years. 
Since the notional principal represents the total quantity of commodity swapped over the 
duration of the swap, the market value sensitivity is estimated as: 
Market value sensitivity of commodity swap= [$notional principal x 37%] 
For approximately 35% of the sample fnms using commodity derivatives, the notional 
principal is stated in units of the underlying commodity instead of dollars. Some fmns disclose 
units and price per unit, thus providing sufficient information to compute notional values. If 
only units are reported, we approximate the notional principal using commodity prices prevailing 
at the end of 1997. 
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Table 1 
Sam pie Characteristics 
Descriptive statistics on All firms Derivatives users Derivatives non-users 
All figure;; in $millions Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
l\fV equity 5877 1673 8571 2376 2384 1145 
Assets 5224 1496 7226 2050 2632 1118 
3-yr avg. CFO 502 127 735 178 201 86 
3-yr avg. NI 219 59 318 74 91 52 
3-yr avg. cash + mkt. securities 253 55 374 71 93 41 
3-yr avg. PPE expenditures 316 91 454 136 138 59 
3-yr avg. investing CF 455 135 637 178 221 106 
3-yr avg. interest expense 123 33 169 50 61 23 
3-yr avg. absolute change in CFO 125 40 194 62 57 30 
3-yr max. absolute change in CFO 241 67 349 104 101 48 
3-yr avg. absolute change in NI 93 30 139 44 48 17 
3-yr max. absolute change in NI 168 44 230 74 88 27 
# offnms 413 234 179 
The sample consists of 413 firms selected uniformly from the 1000 largest firms on Compustat, ranked by maiket value of equity on December 31st, 1995. The 
descriptive statistics are reported for the fiscal year ending December, 1997. MV Equity is common shares outstanding at year end multiplied by stock price at year 
end (Compustat #24 x Compustat #25). Assets is book value of assets at year end (Compustat #6). Three-year Avg. (x) is the average of variable x using data for the 
three years leading up to fiscal year end 1997 when firms' derivatives positions are taken from the Form 10-K filings. CFO is cash from operating activities 
(Compustat #308). NI is net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18). Interest Expense is interest expense (Compustat #15). Firms with no interest 
expense in the year leading up to the date of derivatives measmement i.e., no interest bearing debt in year t) are excluded under the assumption that these firms have 
no reason to use derivatives to hedge interest expense in year t. Cash +Mkt Secmities is cash and short -term investments at year-end (Compustat #1). PPE 
Expenditmes is capital expenditmes (Compustat #30). Investing CF is cash flows from investing activities (Compustat #311). Absolute Change in CFO: Change in 
annual CFO (Compustat #308); tlu-ee annual absolute changes are calculated using fom annual CFO observations leading up to the date of derivatives measmement. 
Absolute Change in NI is calculated using income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18). 
41 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics on derivative positions 
Notional Principal in $million Maturity in years 
Type of derivative #of Mean Std. Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max Mean Std. Dev. 
users 
FX derivatives 
FX forwards/futures 124 442.7 1100.5 0.6 12. 1 68.4 403.5 95 11.0 1.2 0.6 
FX swaps 33 428.1 625.7 0.7 65.0 243. 1 441.0 2874.0 4 .8 4 .2 
FX options 27 290.5 387.4 6.0 42.8 202.9 354.7 1537.0 1.4 0.8 
All FX derivatives 143 537.5 1236.7 0.6 22. 1 122.0 489.8 9561.0 2.4 2.8 
IR derivatives 
lR swaps 137 474.8 697.2 3.8 100.0 180.0 495.0 3678.0 5.0 5.6 
lR caps 15 205.0 255.2 17.7 80.0 100.0 200.0 1003.4 4 .7 5.2 
JR. forwards 9 367.8 458.7 50.0 85.0 200.0 350.0 1500.0 1.1 0.2 
All IR derivatives 143 499.5 746.4 3.8 100.0 200.0 500.0 3678.0 5.4 6.2 
Commodity derivatives 
Commodity forwards/futures 25 128.9 186.8 0.5 21.2 39.4 200.0 679.0 1.9 1.4 
Commodity swaps 13 189.3 278.6 2.2 23.3 50.0 205.8 974.0 1.8 1.2 
Commodity options 8 123.5 223.9 1.4 6.4 41.9 112.9 664 .0 1.5 0.8 
All Commodity derivatives 36 190.6 243.5 0.5 21.2 39.9 275.9 974.0 2.3 2.0 
The sample consists of 234 fitm s that report derivatives use for hedging purposes at fiscal year end 1997. This sample is obtained from a sample of 413 firms selected 
lllllformly from the 1000 largest firms on Compustat, ranked by market value of equity on December 31st, 1995. 
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Table 3 
Cash flow and market value sensitivities of firms' derivatives portfolios at the end of 1997 
Type of derivative Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum 
Market value sensitivity, 
$million 
FX derivatives 108.4 330.2 0.0 0.0 3.6 61.1 3155.1 
IR derivatives 39.4 88.9 0.0 0.0 4.2 34.1 676.0 
Commodity derivatives 10.5 42.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 360.4 
All derivatives 158.3 372.1 0.2 8.6 31.2 128.7 3422.9 
Cash flow sensitivity, 
$million 
FX derivatives 90.1 286.8 0.0 0.0 3.0 41.3 3140.0 
IR derivatives 11.6 26.3 0.0 0.0 2.3 10.3 244.8 
Commodity derivatives 9.9 41.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 360.4 
All derivatives 111.5 299.8 0.2 4.4 15.3 84.7 3238.8 
Market value sensitivity of a firm's derivatives position is the change in the value of each derivatives security in the portfolio for a given change in the prices of 
underlying assets. Cash flow sensitivity of a firm' s derivatives position is the change in the annual cash flow resulting from each derivative security in the portfolio for a 
given change in the price of underlying asset (i.e., change in interest rates, exchange rates, or commodity prices). The sum of cash flow sensitivities or market value 
sensitivities across all the derivative securities yields the cash flow sensitivity and market value sensitivity for the entire derivatives portfolio under the assumption that 
prices of all the underlying assets simultaneously experience the assumed change (i.e. , three standard deviations of annual changes). Details on this procedure are 
provided in Appendix B. 
Table 4 
Scaled cash flow and market value sensitivities of firms' derivatives portfolios at the end of 1997 
Cash flow sensitivities are scaled by operating flow variables and market value sensitivities are scaled by the market value of equity or the 
fmn's book value of assets 
43 
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Ql Median Q3 Maximum 
Mkt. Cap. Sensitivity I MV equity 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 1.15 
Mkt. Cap. Sensitivity I Assets 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 1.20 
CF Sensitivity 13-yr avg. annual CFO 0.58 2.98 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.27 30.23 
CF Sensitivity 13-yr avg. annual NI 0.84 2.74 0.00 0.07 0.19 0.53 34.95 
CF Sens. from IR derivatives 13-yr avg. interest exp. 0.35 1.07 0.00 0.05 0.12 0.26 11.37 
CF Sensitivity 13-yr avg. Cash+ Mkt. Securities 1.18 2.67 0.00 0.06 0.28 1.23 27.37 
CF Sensitivity 13-yr avg. annual PPE expenditures 0.57 1.92 0.00 0.04 0.17 0.48 22.49 
CF Sensitivity 13-yr avg. annual Investing CF 0.40 1.22 0.00 0.03 0.09 0.34 15.08 
CF Sensitivity 13-yr avg. absolute chg. in annual CFO 0.87 1.67 0.01 0.10 0.33 0.88 14.02 
CF Sensitivity 13-yr max. absolute chg. in annual CFO 0.50 0.94 0.00 0.06 0.18 0.53 9.11 
CF Sensitivity 13-yr avg. absolute chg. in annual NI 1.09 1.71 0.00 0.14 0.42 1.27 10.81 
CF Sensitivity 13-yr max. absolute chg. in annual NI 0.65 0.96 0.00 0.09 0.25 0.74 6.46 
Market value sensitivity of a finn's derivatives position is the change in the value of each derivatives security in the portfolio for a given change in the prices of 
underlying assets. Cash flow sensitivity of a firm' s derivatives position is the change in the annual cash flow resulting from each derivative security in the portfolio for a 
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given change in the price of underlying asset (i.e., change in interest rates, exchange rates, or commodity prices). The sum of cash flow sensitivities or market value 
sensitivities across all the derivative securities yields the cash flow sensitivity and market value sensitivity for the entire derivatives portfolio under the assumption that 
prices of all the underlying assets simultaneously experience the assumed change (i.e., three standard deviations of annual changes). Details on this procedure are 
provided in Appendix B. 
MV Equity is common shares outstanding at year end multiplied by stock price at year end (Compustat #24 x Compustat #25). Assets is book value of assets at year end 
(Compustat #6). Three-year Avg. (x) is the average of variable x using data for the three years leading up to fiscal year end 1997 when firms' derivatives positions are 
taken from the Form 1 0-K filings. CFO is cash from operating activities (Compustat #308). NI is net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18). Interest 
Expense is interest expense (Compustat #15). Firms with no interest expense in the year leading up to the date of derivatives measurement i.e., no interest bearing debt 
in year t) are excluded under the assumption that these firms have no reason to use derivatives to hedge interest expense in year t. Cash+ Mkt Securities is cash and 
short-term investments at year-end (Compustat #1). PPE Expenditures is capital expenditures (Compustat #30). Investing CF is cash flows from investing activities 
(Compustat #311). Absolute Change in CFO: Change in annual CFO (Compustat #308); three annual absolute changes are calculated using four annual CFO 
observations leading up to the date of derivatives measurement. Absolute Change in NI is calculated using income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18). 
Table 5 
Stock-return-based exposures 
Interest rate exposure in percent of market value of equity 
Interest rate exposure in dollars of market value of equity 
FX exposure in percent of market value of equity 
FX exposure in dollars of market value of equity 
Stock-return volatility: annualized standard deviation 
of monthly returns 
Stock-retum volatility: expected annualized standard deviation 
of the market value of equity 
Mean 
0.33 
$2939 mil 
0.25 
$1748 mil 
0.30 
$2068 mil 
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Std. Dev. Median 
0.29 0.24 
$8258mil $825 mil 
0.25 0.17 
$3988mil $458 mil 
0.15 0.26 
$4746 mil $627 mil 
The regression model for estimating interest rate and exchange rate exposures is R.t = a + bt f1 T -Bill rat~+ b2% f1 FXt + b3 Rnt +!>it· Interest rate and FX exposures are 
reported only for those firms holding interest rate and FX derivatives, respectively. Interest rate exposure in percent of market value of equity is the absolute value of the 
coefficient from a three-year regression of monthly stock returns on the monthly percentage change in the 6-month T -bill rate (b1 in the regression model) multiplied by 
a 3.4% change in 6-month T -bill rate. Interest rate exposure in dollars of market value of equity is the interest rate exposure in percent of market value multiplied by the 
market value of equity at the end of 1997. FX exposure in percent of market value of equity is the absolute value of the coefficient from a three-year regression of 
monthly stock returns on the monthly percent change in the trade-weighted exchange index (b2 in the regression model) multiplied by a 33% change in trade-weighted 
exchange index. FX exposure in dollars of market value of equity is the FX exposure in percent of market value multiplied by the market value of equity at the end of 
1997. Stock-return volatility: annualized standard deviation of monthly returns is computed over the three years leading up to December, 1997. Stock-return volatility: 
expected annualized standard deviation of the market value of equity is the three year annualized standard deviation of monthly returns multiplied by the market value of 
equity at the end of 1997. 
Table 6 
Firms' derivative portfolios' market value sensitivities scaled by return-based exposures 
Mkt. Cap. Sensitivity I IR exposure 
Mkt. Cap. Sensitivity I FX exposure 
Mkt. Cap. Sensitivity I Stock-return 
volatility 
Mean 
0.29 
0.95 
0.10 
Std. Dev. 
1.53 
4.51 
0.19 
Minimum 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
Ql 
0.01 
0.02 
0.01 
Median 
0.03 
0.06 
0.04 
Q3 
0.12 
0.24 
0.12 
Maximum 
17.08 
44.17 
1.82 
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Market value sensitivity of a firm' s derivatives position is the change in the value of each derivatives security in the portfolio for a given change in the prices of 
underlying assets. The sum of market value sensitivities across all the derivative securities yields the market value sensitivity for the entire derivatives portfolio under 
the assumption that prices of all the underlying assets simultaneously experience the assumed change (i.e., tlu·ee standard deviations of annual changes). Details on this 
procedure are provided in Appendix B. IR exposure, FX exposure, and stock-return volatility are the interest rate exposure in dollars of market value of equity, FX 
exposure in dollars of market value of equity, and the stock-return volatility: expected annualized standard deviation of the market value of equity as described and 
summarized in Table 5. 
Table 7 
Median scaled cash flow and market value sensitivities for first, third, and fifth quintiles of firm-year observations ranked 
independently on determinants of hedging 
Measure of hedging Median Mkt. Cap. Median CF Sensitivity I 3-yr Median CF Sensitivity I 
~ 
Sensitivity I Assets avg. annual Investing CF Largest absolute chg. in annual 
NI from ~revious three ~ears 
Quintile of the proxy for 
1st 3rd 5th 1st 3t·d 5th 1st 3rd 5th determinants ofhedging 
• 
Proxy variables for 
determinants ofhedging 
Leverage 0.017 0.015 0.021 0.139 0.084 0.074 0.139 0.178 0.187 
Market-to-book assets 0.016 0.015 0.022 0.052 0.111 0.171 0.167 0.187 0.211 
3-yr avg. absolute chg. in 
0.012 0.019 0.018 0.054 0.093 0.146 0.190 0.254 0.190 annual (NI I assets) 
3-yr avg. absolute chg. in 
0.012 0.018 0.025 0.081 0.110 0.321 0.411 0.171 0.126 annual (CFO I assets) 
Fraction of total pay as bonus 0.016 0.013 0.013 0.110 0.100 0.078 0.204 0.200 0.363 
Cash + marketable securities 0.013 0.017 0.013 0.058 0.079 0.130 0.247 0.213 0.154 
Sensitivity of wealth to stock 
pnce 0.014 0.011 0.020 0.054 0.104 0.180 0.215 0.249 0.604 
Assets 0.013 0.013 0.019 0.093 0.082 0.130 0.146 0.162 0.393 
Segment diversification 0.015 0.018 0.013 0.074 0.140 0.110 0.260 0.186 0.166 
Geographic diversification 0.010 0.008 0.032 0.045 0.071 0.256 0.113 0.108 0.471 
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Fraction of total pay as bonus is total cash bonus paid to the CEO over the previous 3 years I total pay to the CEO over the previous 3 years. The sensitivity of wealth to 
stock price is the sensitivity of the value of a CEO's stock and option portfolio to a one percent change in stock price. Total diversification is an entropy measure of total 
product diversification calculated from data on the Compustat Industry Segments File and equal to I,P ,ln(J IP J where P, is dollar sales of principal product i scaled by 
total firm sales. Geographic diversification is an entropy measure of geographic diversification calculated from data on the Compustat Geographic Segments File and 
equal to L.Giln(JIGJ where Gi is dollar sales represented by geographic segment i scaled by total firm sales. All other variables are defined in Tables 1 and 4. 
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Table 8 
Discriminating between firm size and geographic diversification as determinants of cash flow and market value sensitivities 
Median Mkt. Cap. Median CF Sensitivity 13- Median CF Sensitivity 13- Median CF Sensitivity I 
Sensitivity I Assets year average annual year average absolute Largest absolute change in 
Investing CF change in annual NI annual NI from previous 
three ears 
Geographic 
diversification Below Above Below Above Below Above Below Above 
~ 
Asset quintile ~ 
median median median median median median median median 
Smallest 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.18 0.24 0.54 0.10 0.19 
2 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.14 0.44 0.68 0.21 0.41 
3 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.15 0.49 0.16 0.14 0.17 
4 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.20 0.14 0.58 0.07 0.28 
Largest 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.26 0.25 1.32 0.17 0.50 
Finns are ranked first into quintiles based on total assets and then ranked within each size quintile into above and below median geographic diversification. All variables 
are defined in Tables 1, 2 and 7. 
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Table 9 
Regressions of cash flow and market value sensitivities on determinants of derivatives use 
Predicted sign Dependent variable(%) 
Cash Flow Sensitivity Mkt. Cap. Sensitivity 
Independent val'iables I Assets I Assets 
Intercept 4.37 1.56 
(1.01) (0.93) 
Leverage + -2.77 1.43 
(-0.87) (1.16) 
Market-to-book assets + -0.43 0.25 
(-0.82) (1.24) 
Log( assets) -0.38 -0.27 
(-0.72) (-1.31) 
Segment diversification +I- -1.03 0.08 
(-1.19) ( 0. 18) 
Geographic diversification +I- 3.68 1.74 
(2.57) (3.13) 
Fraction of total pay as bonus + -4.94 -1.31 
(-1.33) (-0.91) 
Sensitivity of wealth to stock price + 0.65 0.24 
(1.50) (1.41) 
3-yr avg. cash +marketable securities -5.40 -3.21 
(-1.03) (-1.58) 
3-yr avg. absolute chg. in annual (CFO I assets) + 12.16 5.64 
(0.72) (0.87) 
3-yr avg. absolute chg. in annual (NI I assets) + 12.16 5.64 
(0.72) (0.87) 
#of observations 223 223 
Adjusted R-squared 3.1% 6.1% 
t-statistics are in parentheses. All variables are defmed in Tables 1, 2 and 7. 
